Copyright Protection and the Information Explosion by Keating, William J.
Volume 88 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 88, 
1983-1984 
1-1-1984 
Copyright Protection and the Information Explosion 
William J. Keating 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
William J. Keating, Copyright Protection and the Information Explosion, 88 DICK. L. REV. 268 (1984). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol88/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 




The United States Copyright Law is designed to promote pro-
gress in the arts by granting writers exclusive control over their writ-
ings for a limited period of time.' The constitutional mandate does
not specify who may qualify as an author and what may qualify as a
writing. Such details are left for legislative and judicial interpreta-
tion. The question arises, whether a compilation of data, having com-
mercial value, selected from information generally in the public do-
main, qualifies as a "writing" within the meaning of the Copyright
Law. The corollary is whether the Copyright Law is capable of pro-
tecting intangible property comprising selectively arranged
information.
II. History of Copyright Law
A. Early Development
Copyright Law was developed to grant the artist exclusive con-
trol over the product of his creative genius. This right gave the artist
exclusive control over his work product. It was intended to be an
incentive for the artist to create by granting him a valuable property
right. It also was intended to prevent mutilation of the artistic work
by future owners of the property2 which might derogate the artist's
reputation.
The author or artist8 was considered a special person, endowed
with a supernatural gift for creating artistic work. The copyright was
given to the individual, to encourage further creativity. The property
that resulted was considered to be different from the property cre-
ated by ordinary labor and commerce. It became part of the culture
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.S. 1947, Canisius College; J.D.
1954, Georgetown University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2. M. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT 499 (2d ed. 1979).
3. For simplicity, the term "artist" includes both author and artist.
and was endowed with the prestige of a national heritage.
While the artist was creating artistic works, it was still neces-
sary for him to be supplied with the ordinary requirements of life
(food, shelter, clothing and family support) as well as the raw mater-
ials necessary to carry out his craft (studio, canvas, paint, brushes,
marble, models and assistants). Particularly in the formative stages
of his career, before he became famous and his works were accepted
as valuable, it was important that the artist have some financial sup-
port. Since all prospective artists were not equally competent (some
never would become accepted), it was necessary to create a pool,
from which the more gifted artists would surface as their talents
developed.
Thus, the Copyright Law became a vehicle for blending
financial rewards with creative skill. The system was self-balancing,
since the right of exclusive control over the artistic property was val-
uable only if the underlying property was in commercial demand. If
the property was valuable, the artist's reward was commensurate. If
the property was not valuable, granting the artist a copyright mo-
nopoly did not constitute a burden on society.
In addition to the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted
work, many societies granted the artist the right of "patrimony."4
He was assured the right to be identified as the creator of the work.
He was also entitled to a moral right, droit moral, preventing muti-
lation or distortion of his work by future owners of the property em-
bodying his creative expressions. 5
B. Copyright Law and the Advent of the Printing Press and Other
Technologies
Control over reproduction of copyrighted works was manageable
until the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century. For
the first time it became relatively easy to reproduce multiple copies
of literary works in large volume. While the printing press increased
the supply of copyrighted works available for commercial sale, it also
permitted plagiarism to exist on a widespread basis. Most countries
of major economic importance adopted some form of copyright law
to prevent publishers from reproducing literary works without com-
pensation to the author.6 Generally the laws were broad enough to
include artistic as well as literary works.
4. E. PLOMAN & L. C. HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IN-
FORMATION AGE (1980) [hereinafter cited as PLOMAN & HAMILTON].
5. This concept is recognized in many European countries, but generally is not recog-
nized in the United States.
6. Some 89 countries were members of the Universal Copyright Convention or the Berne
Union, or both. L. Abelman & L. Berkowitz, International Copyright Law in THE COMPLETE
GUIDE TO THE NEW COPYRIGHT LAW, 355-59 app. (1977).
Philosophically, the European system tended to structure copy-
right protection to benefit the artist. He was given exclusive control
over reproduction of his work, as well as the right of patrimony and
droit moral.7 Exceptions to such control were limited to instances
having a strong public interest. Doubts about whether copyright pro-
tection existed or was enforceable generally were resolved in favor of
the artist.8
The English system, from which the United States derives its
Copyright Law and practice, emphasizes the right of freedom of ex-
pression, limited only by those restrictions necessary to provide in-
centive to artists to continue creating new works. In this system,
doubts as to copyrightability or enforcement are resolved in favor of
the public interest. The system permits the broadest latitude of free
expression, unfettered by a previous claim of private copyright
protection.'
Despite these philosophical distinctions, both systems over-
lapped to cover works which are primarily commercial in nature,
rather than embodying an element of creative genius. New techno-
logical developments qualified as artistic media, capable of support-
ing copyright protection on work products resulting from the output
of essentially mechanical devices.
An early example of such copyright recognition involves the art
of engraving. A significant improvement in the printing press was
the capability of reproducing pictorial and graphic representations,
in addition to alpha-numeric characters. Early technology developed
a chromolithograhic process. The engraver carved a mirror image of
the representation into a block of metal. Ink then was applied to the
block of metal, and a reproduction of the engraving was stamped on
paper to form the copy. Frequently the subject matter of the picto-
rial representation was in the public domain, for example, a classical
painting. The question arose whether the engraver was also an artist.
Was the reproduction of an artistic work of sufficient creative merit
within the meaning of the Copyright Law, to permit copyright pro-
tection of the engraving? The Supreme Court answered affirmatively
in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.10 The Court held that
7. Supra note 5.
8. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 26.
9. Id. at 26-27.
10. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). See also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99
(2d Cir. 1951),in which the subject of infringement involved mezzotint engravings of paintings
by famous masters, like Gainsborough's "Blue Boy" among others. The mezzotint process in-
volves roughening the surface of a copper plate with a tool having closely spaced teeth. The
outline of the painting is traced on the surface of the copper plate, for example by use of
carbon paper. The engraver, using a scarifying hand tool, then scrapes the picture onto the
copper plate. Light and shading effects are obtained by the depth of the scraping on the rough-
ened surface. Ink is applied to the plate and trial prints are taken. Alterations are made, if
necessary. Appropriate colors of ink are applied to the proper areas, and the plate is capable of
the artistic skill of the engraver was equal to the artistic skill of the
painter, and thus the engraver's work was subject to copyright pro-
tection. While others were free to make their own engravings of the
same classical masterpiece, they were not free to copy the original
engraving. The Court concluded that, although engraving involved a
media different from painting, it was still capable of producing artis-
tic works worthy of copyright protection.
A similar conclusion was reached regarding the technique of
photography. The earliest use of the camera was considered to be a
mere mechanical replication of the scene occurring in front of the
lens," involving neither artistic genius nor artistic creation. Photog-
raphy was considered a trade, not an art. Gradually society recog-
nized that selective use of light, camera angle or choice of subject
and other photographic techniques involved a degree of intellectual
skill that rivaled the artist's choice of paint and subject matter. The
United States Copyright Office eventually added photographs to the
list of copyrightable subject matter, and the courts approved."2
The protection of sound recordings as copyrightable subject
matter similarly got off to a rather poor start. In an early decision by
the United States Supreme Court,' 8 the justices considered a piano
roll, but were unable to recognize it as a "writing" capable of protec-
tion under the copyright laws. This decision provided precedent for
the continued refusal of statutory copyright on the records and tapes
produced by the music publishing industry. While common law cop-
yright always was available for such products, the billions of dollars
worth of recordings spawned by the music publishing industry were
not protected under the federal system of copyright registration until
February 15, 1972.1"
A more recent controversy on copyrightability of technological
innovation revolves around the protection of computer software.' 6
printing a reproduction of the original masterpiece. The engraver renders his interpretation of
the original work. The Court found that this was sufficient originality to qualify for copyright
protection.
11. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). The Court noted that
a strong argument could be made for the proposition that the ordinary protection of a photo-
graph was not copyrightable because it was simply a manual operation using instruments and
preparations to transfer visible representations of existing objects. The Court, however, de-
clined to rule that copyright protection could never be obtained on photographs.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 5(j) (1909); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903).
13. White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
14. The amendment to the Copyright Act of 1909 rendering sound recordings subject to
copyright protection became effective Feb. 15, 1972.
15. The 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976), originally stated that the status of
computer programs prior to the Act was not changed by the Act, without defining this status.
This resolved an impasse between the proponents and the opponents of granting copyright
status to computer software. The Act subsequently was amended to state that computer pro-
grams qualify for copyright protection.
Opponents of such copyright protection argue that computer
software does not constitute the type of artistic contribution envi-
sioned by the Copyright Law. Proponents of such protection argue
that the software merely represents intellectual creativity in a differ-
ent medium. Court decisions seem to favor granting copyright
protection. 0
Although new artistic media have expanded the concept of
copyrightable subject matter, new technology for abetting copyright
infringement has expanded at an even greater rate. The advent and
ubiguity of inexpensive copying machines has made copyright in-
fringement a cottage industry. Audio tape recorders threaten to de-
stroy the music publishing industry.17 Video tape recorders were the
basis of a major copyright infringement suit recently reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court. 8 Inexpensive television adapters per-
mit users to unscramble cable television without paying the required
fees. Dish antennas, available as an "off-the-shelf" item, permit a
home television set to intercept satellite transmission, while avoiding
the cable rental charge.' 9 On-line computers enable users to ex-
change copyrighted works, thereby decreasing the demand for the
original, the publisher's profit and the author's royalty.'
0
III. Copyright Protection of Commercially Valuable, Nonintellec-
tually Creative Subject Matter
In addition to new copyright media resulting from technical
progress, the scope of copyright protection has been extended to in-
clude subject matter of purely commercial value, with little, if any,
intellectual contribution." One of the earliest forms of copyright
16. Midway Mgr. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982), in
which a New Jersey federal district court ruled that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's
copyright protection on the program dedicated to the operation of a popular video game, pro-
moted under the trademark "Pac-Man."
17. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
18. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). In a five to four deci-
sion the Court held that the sale of the recorders did not constitute contributory infringement
when users of the equipment employed the recorders to record copyrighted programs. The
majority also held that the use of the recorders fell within the "fair use" exception of the
Copyright Act, since the copyright owners had not demonstrated some likelihood of harm.
A strong dissent by Justice Blackmun stated that the fair use doctrine was intended to be
limited to "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship or research" and
was never intended to apply to entertainment. Id. at 807 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976)).
He would have remanded the case to the district court to determine the percentage of legal
versus illegal home use recording to resolve the question of contributory infringement. Id. at
815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 81 (discussing the Brussels Satellite Con-
vention's attempt to regulate international "poaching" of satellite signals).
20. Williams and Wilkens Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
21. See Schroeder v. William Morrow and Co., 566 F.2d 3, (7th Cir. 1977), in which
the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to copyright protection on a directory containing
the names and addresses of suppliers of seeds, plants and other material useful to gardeners.
The plaintiff in fact had used other published lists for verification and checking in compiling
protection in the United States covered the formulation of maps. The
infant nation relied heavily on sea-going transportation to promote
commerce. Copyright protection of maps was granted to encourage
and reward cartographers. The purpose was worthwhile, but the ma-
terial protected was basically a commercial document containing in-
formation in the public domain. The question arose whether such a
document was properly within copyright protection. The original
thrust of the Copyright Law after all was to protect the writer or
artist who contributed an element of creative genius.
Since that time, technical, literary and pictorial works, like en-
gineering drawings, models and educational material, have been in-
cluded in the copyright statute.2' While no one questions the value of
such material, the following issue remains to be addressed: Is copy-
right protection the proper vehicle for protecting published works,
the value of which is acquired through selection and compilation of
information otherwise available in the public domain? The emphasis
has shifted from protecting the contribution of creative genius to
protecting material whose value lies in informational content, with-
out the resolution of this basic question. The following are examples
of informational material now afforded copyright protection.
A. Currency Fluctuations
The convertability of foreign currency is central to world trade
and banking. Significant efforts are involved in gathering current
data on exchange rates, transmitting that data to branch offices,
trading currency on the basis of fluctuation and preventing competi-
tors or other traders from getting access to the data. Such informa-
tion has been held to be protectable under the copyright laws of most
countries.'3
B. Commodity Prices
The volatility of the pricing structure of gold, silver and other
precious metals, as well as items like soybeans, coffee, sugar, pork
bellies and orange juice, makes the commodity exchange one of the
most exciting and speculative investment vehicles in the world. For-
tunes are made or lost on a fraction of a point. As with currency
fluctuations, current information control is vital. Should such infor-
mation be protected in the same manner as creative property like the
Mona Lisa or the Sistine Chapel?
the directory.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 5() (1909).
23. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 2-164 (1982); see also R. GORMAN, Copy-
right Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1579
(1963).
C. Weather Forecasting
A corollary to commodity investment is the advantage of being
able to forecast unusual weather conditions and predict their effect
on the world's crops. An unexpected freeze in Brazil can result in the
price of coffee increasing significantly, with a concurrent increase in
the value of coffee futures. A hurricane in Central America can have
the same effect on the sugar crop. Favorable weather conditions may
indicate a bumper crop. Weather reports comprise literary works
which may be protected by copyright. 4
D. News Reporting
Local disaster, civil uprisings, assassinations, stock prices, bond
fluctuations and corporate reports can have a profound effect on the
economy. Any person or corporation capable of collecting informa-
tion about these matters and using it for business or investment ben-
efit has a significant advantage over others who do not have access to
the information. Although others are entitled to collect the material
independently, frequently they do not have the financial capability or
resources to do so. Again the value of the material is not disputed.
The question is whether the Copyright Law can or should protect
literary material whose value lies in its informational content rather
than in its creative attributes.
IV. The "Haves" and the "Have-nots"
The economic advantage possessed by the United States, Japan
and the more affluent countries of Western Europe has not escaped
the notice of the Less Developed Countries (LDC). The LDCs have
concluded that such advantage, in part, is attributable to the owner-
ship and control of informational data described above. They also
perceive the copyright laws as being counter-productive to the LDCs'
attempts to attain parity with the information-rich countries. Efforts
toward attaining an international copyright law have been impaired
by the LDCs' insistence that any acceptable law would have to con-
tain provisions to correct this inequity. The information-rich coun-
tries view such conditions as an attempt by the LDCs to get free
access to informational systems that private interests in the devel-
oped countries have established and maintained at great cost.
The copyright protection confrontation between the developed
countries and the LDCs came to a head in Stockholm, Sweden in
1967. To set the stage, the original international copyright treaty,
was signed by most countries in Berne, Switzerland in 1886.25 The
24. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 213.
25. Id. at 49-51.
treaty guaranteed that each country would give foreign authors and
artists the same copyright protection that it gave to its own authors
and artists.
While the Berne Union has gone through a series of revisions
over the years, the Stockholm Protocol Regarding Developing Coun-
tries was the most radical proposal.26 The Protocol would give broad
concessions to developing countries, permitting them to use the copy-
righted works from other countries under compulsory licensing sys-
tems having terms highly favorable to the developing countries. The
effect would be to undermine, if not destroy, the system of interna-
tional copyrights as it is presently constructed. Furthermore, the
Protocol does not provide a specific definition of what constitutes a
"developing country." There seems to be sufficient flexibility to per-
mit any country to designate itself a developing country. Thus by
sheer numbers, LDCs would be able to achieve an overwhelming
majority under the Stockholm Protocol proposal. While the Stock-
holm Protocol has not been adopted, it brings into focus the diverg-
ing attitudes between the "haves" and the "have-nots" regarding
copyright protection of informational materials.
V. Proposal
The time has come to consider the propriety of copyright-type
protection of the following four types of subject matter: Fine arts
and classical literature created by individuals; fine arts and classical
literature created by hired employees; commercial art and commer-
cial literature; and informational systems. The copyright subject
matter in each of these categories should be given protection com-
mensurate with the objectives of the creation of the work.
A. Fine Arts and Classical Literature Created by Individuals
Works in this category include paintings, sculpture, prose, po-
etry, plays, musical compositions and similar works embodying liter-
ary or artistic craftsmanship created by individuals. The Copyright
Law's application to these works should retain the historical incen-
tives to create by granting the individual artists and authors the ex-
clusive rights to their creative expressions for a limited period of
time. The term of protection should be based on the life of the au-
thor plus a fixed period after the author's death, for example, fifty
years, descendable to the heirs as set forth in the current copyright
statute. The protection should include the rights of patrimony and
droit moral, at least during the life of the author.
26. Id. at 61-63.
B. Fine Arts and Classical Literature Created by Hired
Employees
Subject matter in this category includes works created by a
commercial organization through employees hired to create such
works. While the subject matter might be similar to works in the
first category, the scope of protection would track the incentive to
create marketable products by a commercial enterprise, rather than
the personal satisfaction of the artist. Motion pictures are produced
primarily for profit, not ego stroking. Again, as in the current stat-
ute, a term of seventy-five years from first publication is justified.
Rights of patrimony and droit moral would not be necessary to pro-
tect these commercial rights.
C. Commercial Art and Commercial Literature
The terms "commercial art" and commercial literature" refer to
the purpose of the work, rather than to its marketability or distribu-
tion. Advertising provides good examples of commercial art and
commercial literature. The purpose of advertising warrants granting
exclusivity to the author or artist to preclude others from copying for
competitive purposes. The end use of the material inherently sug-
gests a lower level of creative artistry than fine art or classical litera-
ture. While reasonable persons may differ on the quantity of creative
input involved in commercial advertising, no one seriously would
contend that advertising writers and illustrations would lack incen-
tive to create unless they were afforded the protection of the copy-
right laws.
Since this category of works involves products of low level crea-
tivity, a shorter term of protection seems reasonable, possibly
twenty-five years from publication. Determining the metes and
bounds of this category may require some guidance from the courts.
Perhaps if the Copyright Office charged a filing fee for works of this
category lower than the filing fees of the first two categories, appli-
cants would be inclined to utilize this category. Otherwise, advertis-
ing copy writers and illustrators might be tempted to assert that
their works in fact are classical literature and fine art.
D. Informational Systems
The protection of informational systems is the most difficult to
justify under the copyright laws. Material in this category usually
contains little if any, author creativity or originality. Tariff rates,
restaurant guides, city directories and similar compilations usually
constitute nothing more than an industrious collection of material
otherwise in the public domain. The justification for protection stems
from the expense and labor expended by the compiler in providing a
valuable product. It would be inherently unjust to permit others to
duplicate the work without permission of, or without compensation
to, the original compiler. If the copies are employed in competition
with the original compiler, the injustice is compounded. The second
compiler may gather independently the identical information dis-
closed in the original directory and in fact, may use the original di-
rectory to check accuracy (referred to in the trade as "slipping").
Copying the original work, however, is considered by most courts to
constitute copyright infringement."7
Copyright protection has been extended to directories not for
the traditional reasons of providing incentive for artists and authors
to create, but for lack of any other effective means of protecting the
compiler of a directory from blatant copying by others. The 1909
Copyright Act specifically provided that "directories" constitute a
subclass of material subject to copyright protection. Despite authori-
zation in the statute dating back over seven decades, some courts
still are reluctant to grant copyright protection for directories con-
taining statistical information otherwise available in the public do-
main. Providing alternative protection for such works might motivate
courts to grant such protection, especially if a shorter term of protec-
tion is granted, for example, twenty-five years from publication. The
limited term would not detract from the value of the work in most
cases, since most directories become obsolete within twenty-five
years. Courts, reluctant to grant seventy-five years protection on di-
rectory information, might feel more comfortable granting such pro-
tection for a shorter period of time.
A separate type of exclusive protection for informational sys-
tems would also include protection for computer programs. The crea-
tion of computer programs is a major industry and is expanding at a
geometric rate.28 The weight of authority favors granting copyright
protection on computer programs.2 9 The Copyright Office accepts
copyright applications covering computer programs. An analysis of
the decisions leads to the ineluctable conclusion that the courts grant
such protection because of the intrinsic value of the product and the
investment of time and effort by the programmer rather than to pro-
tect the originality and literary skill of the author.
27. Consumers Union v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 199 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), holding
that facts in a directory are copyrightable. See also J. Squires, Copyright and Compilations in
the Computer Era: Old Wine in New Bottles, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 18
(1976-1977) and cases cited therein. Both the 1909 and the 1976 Copyright Acts specifically
include directories as constituting copyrightable subject matter.
28. M. Oberman, Copyright Protection for Computer Produced Directories, 22 Copy-
RIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1972).
29. Id.
Divorcing computer programs from copyright protection and
protecting them under a statute directed to informational systems
would free the courts from the judicial contortions involved in find-
ing literary creativity in computer programs to justify protecting
them under the Copyright Law. The definition and scope of protec-
tion could be tailored to the particular needs of the generators and
users of informational systems.
VI. Conclusion
The Copyright Law cannot be all things to all people. It serves
a legitimate need in protecting and inspiring artists and giving them
control over their creative works. To the extent that the Copyright
Law has been expanded to cover printed and pictorial material
whose real value depends on the compilation of information, rather
than on a scholarly or creative contribution, courts should be gov-
erned by regulations more truly akin to this function. The creation of
a three-tier system, with different regulations and scope of protection
for different subject matter, would provide an equitable system.
